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THE ESSENTIALS OF A LAW ESTABLISHING
AN INTERNATIONAL COURT*
The First Hague Conference created the permanent Court of
Arbitration, which was its highest achievement. The Second
Hague Conference proposed the establishment of an International
Court of Prize and a Court of Arbitral Justice, and upon these
its fame will forever endure. In the First Conference the idea
of the dreation of an International Court had been promptly laid
aside as soon as it was suggested, it being regarded as imprac-
ticable, if not impossible. Tie acceptance of the proposal by
forty-five nations in the Second Conference marks the rapid
progress of this movement.
An International Prize Court presupposes the existence of war
as the capture of private property of neutrals is only permitted in
maritime warfare. It is a war court and is without jurisdiction
of controversies arising in peace. To establish such a court was
indeed desirable, but even more desirable was the establishment
of a court which should not presuppose the existence of war, but
which should be clothed with authority to pass upon controversies
arising in times of peace, and which if not amicably settled might
lead to war.
The Permanent Court established in 1899 lacked the essential
qualities of a court. To call it a court at all is decidedly a mis-
nomer, and to apply the term permanent to a tribunal temporary
in its character is an even greater fiction. It is a tribunal of arbi-
* Address delivered in Washington, D. C., on December 20, 1912, be-
fore the American Society for Judicial Settlement of International Dis-
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tration with a right in the parties submitting controversies to
select their abitrators. The difference between the court of
1899 and the one proposed in 19o7 is indicated in the instructions
which Mr '. Root issued to the American delegation to the Second
Conference. He said:
"It has been a very general practice for arbitrators to act, not
as judges deciding questions of fact and law upon the record be-
fore them under a sense of judicial responsibility, but as nego-
tiators effecting settlement of the questions brought before them
in accordance with the traditions and usages, and subject to all
the considerations and influences which affect diplomatic agents.
The two methods are radically different, proceed upon different
standards of honorable obligation, and frequently lead to widely
differing results. It very frequently happens that a nation which
would be very willing to submit its differences to an impartialjudicial determination, is unwilling to subject them to this kind
of diplomatic process. If there could be a tribunal which would
pass upon questions between nations with the same impartial and
impersonal judgment that the Supreme Court of the United States
gives to questions arising between citizens of the different States,
or between foreign citizens and the citizens of the United States,
there can be no doubt that nations would be more ready to submit
their controversies to its decision than they are now to take the
chance of arbitration. T- .4'ould be your effort to bring about in
the Second Conference a development of the Hague Tribunal
into a permanent tribunal composed of judges who are judicial
officers and nothing less, who are paid adequate salaries, who
have no other occupation, and who will devote their entire time to
the trial and decision of international causes by judicial methods
and under a sense of judicial responsibility."
The Court of Arbitral justice is an attempt to realize the ideas
involved in Mr. Root's instructions. It is an attempt to set up
a real Court composed of real juris-consults with a right to decide
questions of a legal nature.
Under the Articles of Confederation, the United States was
without a judicial department, but it was ordained in the Ninth
Article that Congress assembled should be the last resort on ap-
peal in all disputes and differences arising between two or more
States "concerning boundaries, jurisdiction or any other cause
whatever." This authority was to be exercised in the following
manner: The legislative or executive authority of a State in con-
troversy with another could present a petition to Congress stating
the matter in difference, and praying for a hearing. Thereupon
Congress notified the other State and a day was assigned for the
appearance of the parties by their agents, and they were then
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directed to appoint by joint-consent, commissions or judges, to
constitute a court for hearing and determining the matter in con-
troversy. If they could not agree, Congress was to name three
persons out of each of the United States, or from the list of such
persons, each party was alternately to strike out one, the peti-
tioners beginning, until the number was reduced to thirteen. From
that number not less than seven nor more than nine names, as
Congress might direct, were to be drawn out by lot in'the presence
of Congress. The persons whose names were so drawn, or any
five of them, were to be the judges who were to hear and finally
determine the controversy. If either party neglected to appear
on the day appointed, without showing reasons satisfactory to
Congress, that body was to nominate three persons out of each
State and the Secretary of Congress was to strike in behalf of
the absent party. The judgment of the court thus appointed
was to be final and conclusive. Each State was pledged to carry
out the award in good faith. No power was conferred upon
Congress to enforce the judgment. One case only was actually
tried and determined under the authority thus conferred. The
case was that of Pennsylvania v. Connecticut. The latter State
had for years made claim to the Wyoming Valley, now the County
of Luzerne, in. Pennsylvania. The laws of Connecticut were at
one time regularly enforced there. The Courts of Connecticut
had administered justice there. Taxes had been levied and col-
lected by Connecticut. Levies from that district made the Twen-
ty-fourth Connecticut Regiment in the Continental Army. The
Articles of Confederation went into effect in 1781 and Pennsyl-
vania at once took advantage of the Ninth Article to apply to
Congress for a court to decide upon the Connecticut claim. Con-
gress, which then held its sessions in Philadelphia, granted the
request and ordered the court to meet at Trenton in November,
1782. The judges, after considering the matter for forty-one
days, renderd an opinion in favor of Pennsylvania. Connecticut
at once acquiesced. The court had agreed in advance that what-
ever its decision might be, it was to assign no reasons for it. An
experience based on a single case is not of great value. The fact
that the defeated sovereignty acquiesced although Congress had
no power given it to enforce the judgment, is without much sig-
nificance. A State as small as Connecticut would not be likely
to make war upon a State the size of Pennsylvania over such a
controversy.
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There were other cases presented to Congress involving like
boundary disputes. That of South Carolina v. Georgia, and that
of Massachusetts v. New York. In each of these cases, a court
was appointed, but the dispute was settled out of court.
The Supreme Court of the United States has been called "A
Tribunal of International Justice". Mr. Webster once referred
to the members of it as "the great arbitrators between contending
sovereignties". In speaking of the court, De Tocqueville said: "In
the nations of Europe, the courts of justice are only called upon to
try the controversies of private individuals; but the Supreme Court
of the United States summons sovereign powers to its bar," The
Constitution gives the court not only jurisdiction of "cases af-
fecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls", but it
also gives it jurisdiction over controversies between two or more
States, and between a State or the citizens thereof and foreign
States, citizens or subjects.
The inefficiency of the then existing machinery for the admin-
istration of justice to foreigners in Egypt, led to the establish-
ment in that country in 1876 of what have been known as the
International Courts. The Powers which have become parties
to the arrangement include the United States, Great Britain,
Germany, France, Austria, Russia, Italy, Spain, Belgium, the
Netherlands, Greece, Denmark, Portugal, Sweden and Norway.
The court which the Conference of 19o7 proposes is one dif-
fering in important particulars from any court the world has
known.
The convention for establishing the Court of Arbitral Justice
contains no provision concerning the law to be applied by the
court. The convention for the establishment of the Interna-
tional Prize Court provides in Article VII that if the question in
issue has been regulated by a treaty between the countries in liti-
gation, the provision of this treaty should be binding upon the
court. It also provides that "in the absence of such (treaty)
provisions, the court shall apply the rules of international law.
If no generally recognized rule exists, the court shall give judg-
ment in accordance with the general principles of justice and
equity". Russia and Japan had each objected at the time the
convention was under discussion that inasmuch as the law relating
to prize was not settled in all its details, an agreement upon the
law to be applied should precede the establishment and operation
of the court. After the Hague Conference adjourned and the
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question as to the ratification of the convention came before the
government of Great Britain, that government made it known
that it could not ratify unless an agreement was first reached as
to certain branches of prize law. It proposed, therefore, an
international conference of naval powers which should meet at
London and reach an agreement concerning the law of prize.
The conference assembled in December, i9O8, and adjourned the
last of February, i9o9, having agreed upon what is known as the
Declaration of London, and which established a code *of rules
regulating the rights of neutrals and belligerents with respect to
neutral commerce.
Should the act which provides for the Court of Arbitral Justice
have made provision for the settlement in some similar fashion of
the international law which shall be applied to the controversies
the court is to determine? We do not regard such a provision
as essential to the establishment of the court. The Courts of
England and of the United States administer justice according
to the principles of the common law without the codification of
that law; and an international court can administer justice ac-
cording to international law and international equity without
waiting for the establishment of an international code, however
desirable such a code may be. The development of international
law has proceeded with a very slow step. It is still in a very
imperfect and unsettled state. Mr. Choate told the New York
Bar Association in i9O8 that he did not know but that it would
be a hundred years longer before a body of international law was
developed to which all the nations would give their assent. To
await the codification of the law and the acceptance of it by forty-
six nations would be to postpone indefinitely the establishment of
the Court.
The Hague Conference of i9o7 adopted the following resolu-
tion: "The Conference recommends to the Signatory Powers,
the adoption of the project hereunto annexed of a con-
vention for the establishment of a Court of Arbitral Justice
and its putting in effect as soon as an accord shall be reached upon
the choice of the judges and the constitution of the Court."
The report of the delegates of the United States to the Confer-
ence made to the Secretary of State, Mr. Root, in calling attention
to this resolution says:
"An analysis of the paragraph shows that the establishment of
the court is not the expression of a mere wish or desire on the
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part of the Conference, but that it is a recommendation to the
Powers to undertake the establishment of the court. In the
next place, the project of convention, annexed to the recommen-
dation, is not to be submitted as a plan or as a model, but for
adoption as the organic act of the court. Again, the convention
annexed and made a part of the recommendation goes forth not
only with the approval of the Conference but as a solemn act
adopted by it, and finally accepting the convention as the organic
act, the Conference recommends that the court be definitely and
permanently established by the Powers as soon as they shall have
agreed upon a method of appointing the judges, who, when ap-
pointed, thus constitute the court. It will be noted that the num-
ber of Powers necessary to establish the court is not stated, nor
is the number of judges determined. It follows, therefore, that
the Powers wishing to establish the court are free to adopt the
project of convention, agree upon the method of choosing the
judges, and establish the court at The Hague for the trial of
cases submitted by the contracting Powers."
From this official explanation of the delegates it is made evi-
dent that The Hague Conference understood that the project of
convention which it submitted was "the organic act of the court"
and not the mere suggestion of a model or of a plan subject to
modification, and amendment and out of which might subse-
quently be developed the organic act of the court.
It is necessary, therefore, to consider the provisions contained
in the organic act as proposed by the Conference. That act re-
lates to the orgdnization of the Court, its jurisdiction and its pro-
cedure.
Those provisions, 'contained in thirty-five articles, show that
what is proposed is a permanent Court of Arbitral Justice, com-
posed of judges who are to decide causes by judicial methods and
under a sense of judicial responsibility. In this respect, it differs
from the so-called court created by the First Conference. That
court is not abrogated by the new court but is continued in exist-
ence. .The court of 1899 is a court only in name. It provides
an arrangement for the selection of referees for each particular
case, never consisting of the same persons. The court of 1907 is
a real court composed of judges learned in the law.
Article I provides that the court shall be "composed of judges
representing the various judicial systems of the world, and capable
of ensuring continuity in jurisprudence of arbitration." And
Article II provides, "The Judicial Arbitration Court is composed
of judges and deputy judges chosen from persons of the highest
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moral reputation, and are fulfilling conditions qualifying them in
their respective countries to occupy high legal posts, or be jurists
of iecognized competence in matters of international law." The
judges are to be appointed for a term of twelve years. They
are to be equal in rank, and are to enjoy diplomatic privileges and
immunities in the exercise of their functions outside their own
country. They are to receive an annual salary of 6,ooo Nether-
land florins, approximately $2,400. In the exercise of their
duties during the session of the Court, they receive in addition
the sum of ioo florins per diem, approximately $4o a
day. They are further entitled to receive a traveling allow-
ance fixed in accordance with regulations existing in their
own country. They cannot accept from their own government
or from that of any other power any remuneration for services
connected with their duties in their capacity of members of the
court. The general expenses of the court, including the salaries
of the judges, are to be paid through the International Bureau,
and are to be borne by the contracting powers. A judge is for-
bidden to exercise his judicial functions in any case in which he
has in any way taken part. Article VII provides that, "A judge
may not exercise his judicial functions in any case in which he
has, in any way whatever, taken part in the decision of a national
tribunal, of a tribunal of arbitration, or of a commission of in-
quiry, or has figured in the suit as counsel or advocate for one of
the parties. A judge cannot act as agent or advocate before the
Judicial Arbitration Court or the Permanent Court of Arbitration,
before a special tribunal of arbitration, or a commission of in-
quiry, nor act for one of the parties in any capacity whatsoever
so long as his appointment lasts.". The seat of the court is es-
tablished at The Hague "and cannot be transferred," so reads
Article XI, unless absolutely obliged by circumstances, elsewhere.
The delegation may choose, with the assent of the parties con-
cerned, another site for its meetings, if special circumstances ren-
der such a step necessary. The court is to meet in session once
a year. The session is to open the third Wednesday in June and
to last until all the business on the agenda has been transacted.
Provision is made by which the court -may be summoned in ex-
traordinary session and by which it need not meet in annual ses-
sion if such meeting is unnecessary, there being no business to
come before it.
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The organic act as drawn by the Conference provides concern-
ing procedure in Article XXII that "The Judicial Court of Arbi-
tration follows the rules of procedure laid down in the conven-
tion for the pacific settlement of international disputes, except in
so far as the procedure is laid down in the present conven-
tion", and in Article XXXII that "the court itself draws up
its own rules of procedure, which must be communicated to
the contracting powers." In Article XXXII it is provided that
"The court determines what language it will itself use, and what
languages may be used before it." In Article XXV it is declared
that "For all notices to be served, in particular on the parties, wit-
nesses, or experts, the court may apply direct to the government
of the State on whose territory the service is to be carried out.
The same rule applies in the case of steps being taken to procure
evidence. The requests addressed for this purpose can only be
rejected when the power applied to considers them likely to impair
its sovereign rights or its safety. If the request is complied
with the fees charged must only comprise the expenses actually
incurred. The court is equally entitled to act through the power
on whose territory it sits." .The articles also provide that de-
cisions are to be arrived at by a majority of the judges present
and that the judgment of the court must give the reasons on
which it is based. It must contain the names of the judges tak-
ing part in it and be signed by the president and registrar. Each
party pays its own costs and an equal share of the costs of the
trial. The organic act has been most carefully drafted and con-
tains the essential provisions which should be embodied in such
a law.
It is true the act as proposed provides no way by which the
court is to enforce its judgments. Blackstone, discoursing upon
municipal law, tells us that of all the parts of a law the most ef-
fectual is the vindicatory, and that the main strength and force
of a la-&r consists in the penalty annexed to it. To say do this
or avoid that, he says, is but lost labor unless it is also declared
that the consequences of non-compliance shall be thus and so.
In the sanction or penalty of the law lies its principal obligation.
The discussion of a possible international court has necessarily
involved the question whether such a court can be of use unless
authority is conferred upon it which will enable it to enforcee its
judgment by an international police or an international military
force. It has been argued that the nations ought to agree in es-
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tablishing the court, that if any state or nation which submits
a controversy to the court's judgment should fail to comply with
the court's decision, all the other nations shall put at the court's
command so much of their military force as may be necessary to
secure obedience to the decree. In not providing for such con-
tingencies in the act which The Hague Conference submits we
are not to conclude that the law is deficient in an essential or most
essential requirement. The sanction which secures obedience to
municipal laws does not consist exclusively or. chiefly of the pains
and penalties imposed by the law for its violation. The fact is
that obedience to law is one of the highest of moral obligations.
Socrates so recognized it and it is related of him that he made a
promise with himself to observe the laws of his couitry. A
commentator remarks that "this is nothing more than what every
good man ought both to promise and perform". He adds, and
this the Governor of South Carolina needs to have impressed on
his mind, "he ought to promise still further that he will exert all
his power to compel others to obey them." Obedience to the
law is also due to the compulsion of public opinion. Men obey
the laws because they fear the disgrace which follows the repudia-
tion of the standard of conduct prescribed by the community for
its members. The force of a law is in the public opinion which
enacte4 it and keeps it on the statute-book. Laws cannot be en-
forced except in so far as they accord with the public opinion of
the community to which they apply. The dread of the com-
munity's condemnation is as certainly a deterrent influence as is
the fear of the penalty which the law imposes upon those who
break it. In most instances the effectiveness of the law is due
to the respect which men entertain for public opinion, and the
desire men have to be thought well of by the community in which
they live. An international court is not therefore valueless be-
cause it is not provided with a sheriff and a policeman as the
guarantors that its judgment will be enforced. If the court is
to be dispensed with on that ground, we should go a step further
and repudiate the whole body of rules which together constitute
international law and dismiss them as altogether worthless be-
cause they are without a sanction.
In the very able address on the "Sanction of International Law"
which Mrj Root delivered in 19o8 before the American Society of
.International Law, be made it very evident that after all the ab-
sence of a "sanction" in international law was not nearly so im-
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portant as many were inclined to suppose. The isolation of
nations has broken down and they have ceased to be indifferent tQ
the opinions which each entertains of one another in the comn_
Diunity of nations. The nations most advanced in civilization,
and they are the most ppwerfipl of states, well under-tand 'hat
the laws established by civilization 
-for the guidance of national
conduct cannot be ignored with impunity." In alluding to the
absence of technical "sanction" from international law, Mr. Root
sajc:
! Nevertheless, all the foreign offices qf the civilized world arecpptiqually discussing with each other questions pf internationallaw, both public and private, cheerfully and hopefully marshaling
facts, furnishing evidence, presenting arguments, and b4il(ing
up repords, designed to show that the rules of international lg.w
require such and such things to be done or such" nd such things
tp be left undpne. And in countless cases nations are yieldingto such argqpients and shaping their copduct against their own
apparent ifiterests in the particular cases under discussion, in
obedience to the rules which are shown to be applicable. Why isit that pations are thus continually yielding to arguments with
no apparent comppisipn hehin d them, and before the force pf
such arguments abandoning purposes, modifying conduct, andgiving redress for injuries? A careful consideration of this
question seems to lead to the conclusion that the difference be-
t~ween mrunicipal and international lW, in respect of the existence
of forces complelling obedience, is more apparent than real, and
that there Arp sanctions for the enforcement of international law
no less real qnd established than those which secur@ obpdiepce tQ
municipal law."
It j§ not believed to be necessary that any provision should. he
made whereby the Arbitral Court should summon to its Aid if' the
enforcemelt pf its j ndgments, any constabulary or military power
whatsoever. No provision of this kind is to be found in the
articles establishing either the Permanent Court, the International
Prize 'Court, or the Court of Arbitral justice. Any pation which
submits its controversies in good faith to any one of theq courts,
agrees thereby to carry into effect with the least possible delay thejudgments which may be rendered.
The United States has §ubmitted to international arbitration
a number of questions which had previously been decided by the
Supreme Court and in at least six of them, the tribunal of arbi-
tration decided them adversely to the opinions rendered in the
Supreme Court of the United States. (The cases on the Hia-
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watha, 67 U. S., 638; the Circassian, 69 U. S., 135; the Spring-
bock, 72 U. S., i ; the Sir William Peel, 72 U. S., 517; the Volant,
72 U. S., 179; the Science, 72 U. S., 178.) In no one of these
cases did the government hesitate to comply with the award. For
one hundred years, the United States has been submitting its dis-
putes to arbitration. We have had many such arbitrations and one
who carefully examines the decisions rendered by the Arbitral Tri-
bunals will come to the conclusion that they are inferior to those
rendered in the Supreme Court of the United States. But not
in a single instance has the government failed to abide by the
award. This is nothing to its credit. It has kept faith with the
arbitrators and could have taken no other course save with dis-
honor. Other nations have pursued a like course and there is
no reason for supposing that any different course will be pursued
by any nation which submits a controversy to the Arbitral Court.
The judgments of the Supreme Court of the United States in
which States are concerned, are satisfied without the employment
of force. It is believed that in the history of the Court but one
instance exists in which force was used, and that was in i8o8.
The case was that of the sloop Active which had been condemned
in 1777 by the Pennsylvania Admiralty Court as prize to an
armed vessel of that State, deciding against an adverse claim by
one Olmstead. Congress reversed the judgment and granted an
injunction forbidding the State Marshal to account to the State
court for-the proceeds. The injunction was disregarded and the
money was paid in 1778 to the State court and delivered by it
to the State Treasurer, Rittenhouse. The claimants in i8o3 ob-
tained a personal judgment for this money against the personal
representative of Rittenhouse and were about to enforce it. The
legislature of Pennsylvania thereupon passed an act denying the
jurisdiction of the Federal Court and the validity of its judgment
and directing the Governor to protect the representatives of Rit-
tenhouse against any process of any Federal Court issued against
them. Whereupon the Attorney-General applied in I8o8 to the
Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of mandamus
commanding the judge of the District Court to enforce the judg-
ments. The mandamus was awarded and the district judge
issued his writ. When the attempt was made to serve it, the
United States Marshal found he was obstructed by the bayonets
of an armed guard which under the Governor's orders had been
placed around the houses of the representatives of Rittenhouse,
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and in charge of General Bright commanding a brigade of militia.
The Marshal summoned a posse comitatus of two thousand men,
but delayed further action that there might be time for reflection.
The Governor appealed to President Madison to interfere, who
firmly refused. The State authorities gave way, the writ was
served, and the money paid over. General Bright and his men
were indicted, tried, convicted, and sentenced in the United States
Circuit Court. The difficulty arose in the early history of the
Court and was occasioned by a conviction that the Federal Courts
were without jurisdiction because of the Eleventh Amendment.
The experience of the Supreme Court in enforcing its decrees
without a resort to force affords encouragement to believe that
the judgments of the Court of Arbitral Justice will be in like
manner respected by any nation which submits a controversy for
its adjudication. It is true that the Supreme Court has behind
it the strength of the nation, and that no State is at all likely to
measure its strength against that of the United States. On the
other hand, no nation is to be compelled to submit its differences
to the Arbitral Court and if it comes into the court with any par-
ticular question, it does so of its free will and accord. It can
not be supposed that having voluntarily taken that step it will de-
cline to abide by the judgment pronounced. It could not do so
without covering itself with dishonor before the nations of the
world.
Difficulty there had been some years earlier over a decision ren-
dered by the court, in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dallas, 419. In
1792 the Supreme Court issued a writ against the State of Georgia
at the suit of Chisholm, a citizen of South Carolina, who sought
payment of a'private claim. The writ was returned duly served
upon the Governor and Attorney-General. The State made no
appearance and judgment was rendered by default. In the mean-
while the legislature of Georgia passed resolutions denying the
obligation of the State either to answer the process or to obey
the judgment of the court. Later, after judgment was actually
rendered, the legislature announced the penalty of death against
anyone who presumed to enforce the process within the State of
Georgia. In this case there was no resistance to the Marshal.
The collision was only threatened. It never came. The plain-
tiff delayed proceedings, awaiting action on the Eleventh Amend-
ment which had already been proposed and soon was ratified by
the States. Thereupon the Supreme Court renounced jurisdic-
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tion "in any case past or future" in which a State was served by
a citizen of another State, and the matter ended.
The organic act proposed by the Conference is defective in
that it does not determine the number of the judges or the man-
ner in which they are to be appointed. Upon these matters, the
Conference could come to no agreement, and it was left open,
the understanding being that some conclusion might be reached
through subsequent negotiations.
The Brazilian plan, that each nation invited to The Hague
should have the right to name one of the judges, would result, in
case it were adopted, in making the Court unwieldy. As Mr.
Scott pointed out in his address at The Hague, forty-six judges
form a judicial assembly, not a court. The Supreme Court of
the United States only consists of nine members. The English
Supreme Court of Judicature consists of thirty-three judges, but
it is divided into a High Court of justice and a Court of Appeal.
In the Court of Appeal there are nine judges. The High Court
of Justice is divided into three divisions,. In the King's Bench
division there are eighteen judges, in the Chancery division fif-
teen, and in the Probate division and Admiralty division, only
two. The suggestion that a Court of fifteen judges is large
enough is sound. The convention establishing the International
Prize Court fixed the number of judges at fifteen, and provided
that nine should constitute a quorum. Is there any good reason
why the same provision should not be incorporated into the con-
vention respecting the Arbitral Court?
Mr. Choate addressed the Conference on two different occa-
sions concerning the selection of the judges. He submitted ten
different propositions and urged, with all the earnestness of
which he was capable, the adoption of some one of them, even
though it should be accepted simply as a provisional scheme. One
proposals was for a court of seventeen judges and that eight of
the larger nations having a more numerous population and larger
commercial and industrial interests, and therefore confronted
with more frequent controversies, should have a constant repre-
sentation in the court, while the smaller nations were each to
have representation for a longer or shorter period by a system of
rotation. Another proposal was for the Conference to deter-
mine by vote a definite number of nations who should each be
authorized to appoint d judge for the full term of the court.
Still another proposal was that the Conference should elect a pre-
scribed number of judges, each nation having an equal voice and
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casting one vote. The last of his proposals was that each signa-
tory power should propose a judge and an assistant and that the
list thus made should be submitted to each signatory power, and
that every power voting at the same time should choose from this
list, each nation voting for fifteen judges and fifteen assistants,
and the fifteen judges and the fifteen asistants who received the
greatest number of votes should be declared elected.
M. de Martens submitted a plan which was that each country
designate an elector taken from the list of members of the Per-
manent Court and that these forty-five electors should in their
turfi choose fifteen judges, who should constitute the court.
Mr. Choate was ready to adopt any -one of the ten plans, but
the Conference could agree upon none of them.
Article XV respecting the Prize Court is as follows:
"The judges appointed by the following contracting powers:
GQermany, the United States of America, Austria-I-Iungary.
F7rance, Great Britain, Italy, Japan and Russia, are always sum-
nioned to sit. The judges and deputy judges appointed by
the other contracting powers sit by vote, as shown in the table
annexed to the present conventio.n, and their duties may be per-
fqrmed successively by the same person. The same judge may be
appointed by several of the said powers."
It is difficult to understand why such a provision could be
adopted as respects the Court of Prize, but could not be accepted
as respects the Arbitral Court.
It would seem, too, that it should be entirely practicable to
agree upon some uniform principle concerning the method by
which a government entitled to appoint a judge to membership
in the court should make the appointment. While the differences
in the methods of governments make it impossible to agree upon
a uniform mode of appointment, they should not make it impossible
to rcach an agreement upon a uniform principle. It ought to be
possible to agree that each government entitled to appoint a judge
should make the appointment in the same manner it appoints thejudges in its .own courts of last resort. A judge selected by the
United States should be nominated by the President and con-
firmed by the Senate. In England the appointment would be
by the Crown acting on the advice of the Prime Minister, who
generally would be governed by the advice of the Lord Chancellor.
In France the appointment would be made by the 'resident, act-
ing on the advice of the Minister of Justice. In Germany it
would be made through the Federal Council and the Emperor.
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The International Court should be a world court, the court of
all the nations. The existence-of such a Court ought to appeal
especially to the small nations, because it would secure to them
that protection against more powerful states which -thei'r own
strength could not afford. Before such a court all states would
be equal. "It is only," as James Brown Scott well said, "wiei
we leave the realm of law and face brute force that inequality
appears. It is only when the sword is thrown upon the stales
of justice that the balance tips."
But if the small and the great states cannot agree upon the
choice of the judges of a world court, the failure to reach an
understanding upon this essential point should not long deter the
United States, England, Germany and the other great powers
from coming to an agreement and establishing the court and
putting it into immediate operation with the understanding -that
the other states would be admitted from time to time as soon as
they could agree to accept the scheme as finally adopted.
In an important particular, I find myself unable entirely to
agree with the organic act as submitted by the Conference. Under
that act the court not only has jurisdiction to decide questions of
law, but it is also given concurrent jurisdiction with the Perma-
nent Court of i8o9 over questions other than those of a judicial
nature, and which may be submitted by way of arbitration. It
is also provided that a delegation of three judges is competent to
settle the compromis referred to in Article 52 of the convention
for the pacific settlement of international disputes, and that it
may do so in certain cases when the request is made only by one
of the parties concerned. I have found it impossible to rid
myself of the conviction that it would be better if the court could
be restricted exclusively to questions of a judicial nature, and that
all other questions should be left to the Permanent Court of 1899.
I would prefer a court, like the Supreme Court of the United
States, which shall decide purely legal questions on the basis of
respect for law. All through its history our Supreme Court has
endeavored to confine the exercise of its powers strictly to mat-
ters of a judicial character. The wisdom of its course has been
amply justified. It would seem that there would also be some
considerable advantage if the International Prize Court and the
Court of Arbitral justice should be merged in a single tribunal.
It is difficult to see adequate reason for keeping them distinct.
To unite them would increase the dignity of the Court.
Henry Wade Rogers.
